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Abstract  
Background: An issue of concern to the travelling public is the possibility of in-flight 
transmission of COVID-19 during long- and short-haul flights.  The aviation industry 
maintain the probability of contracting the illness is small based on reported cases, modelling 
and data from aerosol dispersion experiments conducted on-board aircraft. 
Methods: Using experimentally derived aerosol dispersion data for a B777-200 aircraft and a 
modified version of the Wells-Riley equation we estimate inflight infection probability for a 
range of scenarios involving quanta generation rate and face mask efficiency.  Quanta 
generation rates were selected based on COVID-19 events reported in the literature while 
mask efficiency was determined from the aerosol dispersion experiments.  
Results: The MID-AFT cabin exhibits the highest infection probability.  The calculated 
maximum individual infection probability (without masks) for a 2-hour flight in this section 
varies from 4.5% for the “Mild Scenario” to 60.2% for the “Severe Scenario” although the 
corresponding average infection probability varies from 0.1% to 2.5%.  For a 12-hour flight, 
the corresponding maximum individual infection probability varies from 24.1% to 99.6% and 
the average infection probability varies from 0.8% to 10.8%.   If all passengers wear face 
masks throughout the 12-hour flight, the average infection probability can be reduced by 
approximately 73%/32% for high/low efficiency masks. If face masks are worn by all 
passengers except during a one-hour meal service, the average infection probability is 
increased by 59%/8% compared to the situation where the mask is not removed.  
Conclusions: This analysis has demonstrated that while there is a significant reduction in 
aerosol concentration due to the nature of the cabin ventilation and filtration system, this does 
not necessarily mean that there is a low probability or risk of in-flight infection.  However, 
mask wearing, particularly high-efficiency ones, significantly reduces this risk. 
 




It is generally accepted that aviation has played a key role in spreading the coronavirus 
disease 2019 (COVID-19) around the world resulting in the 2020 pandemic [1-4]. In the very 
early days of the pandemic, prior to the shutting of international boarders, the introduction of 
flight restrictions [5, 6] and health checks at airports, passengers infected with COVID-19 
that were asymptomatic, pre-symptomatic or suffering from mild symptoms are likely to have 
carried, albeit unknowingly, the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-
CoV-2) to every corner of the world.   
As our awareness of the COVID-19 disease has grown, and with the introduction of measures 
such as quarantining, rapid contact tracking, enhanced hygiene precautions, rapid swab 
testing, masking and passenger temperature checks, there is a growing desire, from both the 
aviation industry and the public for the normalisation of national and international 
business/leisure flights.  At the time of writing (late November 2020) as much of the world 
enters the festive season marked by Thanksgiving and Christmas, more and more people are 
considering taking flights.  Given our current knowledge of SARS-CoV-2 and the measures 
now in place, it is less likely that flights will be a major mechanism for the continued 
uncontrolled spread of COVID-19 around the world.  However, another issue of concern is 
the possibility of contracting the disease while confined to the small space of the passenger 
cabin, in close proximity to other passengers, especially for extended periods of time ranging 
from around 2-hours for short-haul flights to 12-hours or more for long-haul flights.   
 
SARS-CoV-2 has both significant transmission from pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic 
persons and the secondary cases may remain asymptomatic even with a 14-day follow-up 
period [7]. Therefore, a COVID-19 case confirmed days after taking a flight could have been 
infected before departure; at the departure/arrival airport; on the journey to/from the airport; 
or on the flight. As timing is so critical, confirmation of inflight SARS-CoV-2 transmission 
cases with a high degree of certainty are limited. Seven inflight SARS-CoV-2 transmission 
events from 24 January 2020 to 21 September 2020 from peer-reviewed or public health 
publications have been comprehensively reviewed in [7]. In one of these events, it is reported 
that one symptomatic passenger likely infected 15 secondary cases during a 10-hour flight 
[8].  A recent study suggests that, despite passengers having negative SARS-CoV-2 test 
results pre-flight, it is likely that inflight transmission occurred [4]. Nevertheless, the aviation 
industry claim that even with an infectious passenger on board, the inflight infection risk is 
low and cite the use on-board of high ventilation rates (up to 30 air changes per hour (ACH)) 
and HEPA filters as effective mitigations to aerosolised dispersion of SARS-Cov-2 [9-12].  
 
Given the difficulties with exploring anecdotal accounts of potential inflight infection events, 
computational modelling [9-11, 13] and experimental techniques [14, 15] have been deployed 
to investigate potential inflight transmission mechanisms.  One of the largest experimental 
studies involved more than 300 experiments using United Airlines Boeing 767-300 and 777-
200 twin aisle aircraft, conducted by the United States Transportation Command (US 
Transcom) to simulate the transportation of aerosol particles (1 to 3 µm) from a source 
representing a passenger infected with SARS-CoV-2 [14, 15]. These experiments showed 
that the aerosol was rapidly diluted by the high cabin ACH, resulting in a minimum reduction 
of 99.7% and an average of 99.99% for the 40+ passenger breathing zone penetration (BZP) 
monitoring points measured in each section of the aircraft. A main conclusion of this study 
was that the aerosol exposure risk is minimal even during long-haul flights.  
 
A fundamental limitation of the analysis presented in [15] is that simply presenting the 
reduction in aerosol concentration, even though it is significant, does not quantify the impact 
this may have on the probability of infection.  The Wells-Riley model [16] provides a way to 
estimate infection probability in a confined ventilated space using quanta generation and 
ventilation rates.  Marcus et al. [13] used the Wells-Riley model together with a Multi-zone 
Markov Model to estimate the required flight-time to cause an infection. The work concluded 
that the time to infection is very large provided masks are worn, and so the likelihood of 
inflight transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is minimal, supporting the claim made in [14, 15].  
However, the use of time to infection, as an assessment criterion, is overly simplistic and 
liable to be misunderstood.  The probability determined by the Wells-Riley model represents 
the proportion of the population or the probability that an individual is likely to be infected by 
the given inhaled quanta. Quanta, a term defined by Wells [17], suggests that if a person 
inhales one quanta of virus, the probability that they will be infected is 63%. Therefore, rather 
than simply identifying the time to infection, the probability of infection associated with an 




Using experimental data for the B777-200 aircraft [14, 15] and a modified Wells-Riley 
model, we estimate the inflight infection probability (assuming aerosol transmission) within 
the MID-AFT (economy class) and FWD (business class) sections of the aircraft.  These 
cabin sections represent the areas with the highest and lowest experimentally derived values 
of maximum aerosol BZP respectively.   
 
The Wells-Riley equation [16] is given by: 
𝑝 = 1 − 𝑒−𝐼𝑞𝑣𝑡/𝑄                                                                                      (1) 
where p is probability of infection; I is number of index patients; v is pulmonary ventilation 
rate of each susceptible (m3/h); Q is space ventilation rate (m3/h); q is quanta generation rate 
produced by one index patient (quanta/h); and t is exposure time (h). The term Iqvt/Q 
represents the number of quanta inhaled (dose received) during the time period t and Iqt is the 
number of total released quanta.  The experimental data [14, 15] records the percentage of 
released aerosols received by a susceptible, denoted as, r, involving a single index patient (I 
=1), which is equivalent to the ratio of Iqvt/Q to Iqt.  Therefore, the infection probability 
based on the data in [14, 15] can be expressed as: 
𝑝 = 1 − 𝑒−𝑞𝑟𝑡                                                                                                                      (2) 
If the index patient wears a face mask with efficiency a in preventing aerosols being released 
(i.e. captures a fraction a of the droplets) and the susceptibles wear a face mask with 
efficiency b (prevents a fraction b of the droplets from being inhaled) then Equation (2) 
becomes 
𝑝 = 1 − 𝑒−𝑞((1−𝑎)(1−𝑏)𝑟)𝑡                                                                                                  (3) 
Furthermore, there may be periods where all the passengers within a cabin section remove 
their masks at the same time, for example during a meal service.  Assuming a temporary 
removal of masks for a time duration, the infection probability becomes  
𝑝 = 1 − 𝑒−𝑞𝑟𝑡1−𝑞((1−𝑎)(1−𝑏)𝑟)𝑡2                                                              (4) 
where t1 is the duration where none of the passengers wear masks and t2 is the duration where 
all passengers wear masks.   
The model parameters and associated values used in the analysis are presented in Table 1. 
Three quanta generation rates are considered, 100 quanta/h, 20 quanta/h and 5.0 quanta/h, 
representing nominal Severe, Medium and Mild scenarios, respectively.  These values are 
representative of the wide range of quanta generation rates suggested or derived from data for 
various COVID-19 transmission events reported in the literature [ 13, 18-20], (see 
Supplementary Table S1). These values are also consistent with quanta rate distributions (for 
breathing, speaking*, and speaking loudly* index cases (*adjusted for resting conditions, see 
Supplementary Table S2) proposed by Buonanno et al. [18]. The mild, medium and severe 
cases lies between the 90th to 95th percentile of their breathing, speaking and speaking loudly 
distributions respectively.  Further evidence justifying the use of the quanta release rate used 
in the severe case is derived from a known inflight COVID-19 asymptotic transmission event 
[4].  Using Equation (1) with the known infection probability derived for this inflight 
COVID-19 transmission event and the measured average aerosol reduction rate of 99.99% 
[14, 15], the quanta generation rate is back-calculated to be at least 102 quanta/h (see 
Supplementary Table S3).  It is also noted that Marcus et al. [13] used 100 quanta/h as the 
high emission rate for aircraft COVID-19 infection risk analysis.   
 
It is noted that the experimental BZP data (parameter r in Equation (3)) presented in [14, 15] 
should be scaled by a factor of 2.14 as the experiments used a sampling rate of 3.5 l/minute 
but the average respiratory rate for a resting human is 7.5 l/minutes. Two mask efficiencies of 
31.0% and 65.6% are considered, derived from inflight aerosol experiment [14, 15] within 
the B777-200 cabin (see Supplementary Table S4). The infection probabilities derived in this 
analysis were determined for short- and long- haul flight-times of 2- and 12- hour 
respectively.  
Table 1. Model parameter and values. 
Parameter Explanation Unit value 
q Quanta generation rate Quanta/h 5, 20 and 100 (see the 
Supplementary Data) 
r Ratio of quanta inhaled 
by a susceptible to the 
total released by the 
index patient 
dimensionless The measured BZP for the B777-200 
aircraft without the impact of face 
masks: Figures 18 and 19; data for 
Tests 19-21, 25-28,  52-54 and 59-63  
[15]  
a Mask efficiency for the 
index 
dimensionless Minimum 31.0% and maximum 
65.6% (see Supplementary Table 
S4) 
b Mask efficiency for the 
susceptible 
dimensionless Minimum 31.0% and maximum 
65.6% (see Supplementary Table 
S4) 
t1  Meal service duration 
 
hour Not considered for the 2-hour flight 
scenario, 1 for the 12-hour flight 
scenario with meal service 
t2 Duration that all 
passengers wear face 
masks  
hour Either 2 and 12 if masks worn 
throughout the 2-hour and 12-hour 
flights respectively or 11 for 12-hour 
flight when masks are removed for 




For a 2-hour flight, the MID-AFT cabin has a calculated maximum infection probability that 
varies from 4.5% (Mild Scenario) to 60.2% (Severe Scenario). The average infection 
probability varies from 0.1% to 2.5%.  An average infection probability of 2.5% for the 
Severe Scenario implies that 1.2 of the 49 passengers seated in the monitored section of the 
cabin are likely to be infected.  If the average infection probability applied to the entire cabin 
section, then 1.9 of the 75 passengers are likely to be infected.  In contrast, the section with 
the smallest maximum and average probabilities of infection (FWD section) has a calculated 
maximum infection probability of 10.9% and an average infection probability of 0.9% (both 
for the Severe Scenario).  With an average infection probability of 0.9%, if the average 
infection probability applied to the entire cabin section, then 0.4 of the 50 passengers and 
crew seated in the FWD section are likely to be infected.   
 
Infection probability increases with exposure time however, the relative increase of infection 
probability within low risk locations is larger than those in high risk locations (see Table 2).  
 
For a 12-hour flight, the estimated maximum infection probability (MID-AFT) varies from 
24.1% (Mild Scenario) to 99.6% (Severe Scenario) while the average infection probability 
varies from 0.8% to 10.8%.  With an average infection probability of 10.8% for the Severe 
Scenario, 5.3 of the 49 passengers seated in the monitored section of the cabin would be 
infected.  If the average infection probability applied to the entire cabin section then 8.1 of 
the 75 passengers would be infected.  In contrast, for the FWD section with an average 
infection probability of 4.5% (Severe Scenario), if the average infection probability applied to 
the entire cabin section, then 2.3 of the 50 passengers and crew would be infected.   
 
Table 2. The estimated inflight infection probability and expected number of secondary 






Maximum, Average infection probability (%) and expected number of 
secondary infections 
5 quanta/h  
(Mild Scenario) 
20 quanta/h  
(medium Scenario) 
100 quanta/h  
(Severe Scenario) 
Max Mean Exp Max Mean Exp Max Mean Exp 
2 MID-AFT 4.5% 0.14% 0.10 16.8% 0.56% 0.42 60.2% 2.5% 1.9 
FWD 0.6% 0.04% 0.02 2.3% 0.18% 0.09 10.9% 0.86% 0.4 
12 MID-AFT 24.1% 0.82% 0.61 66.9% 2.8% 2.1 99.6% 10.8% 8.1 
FWD 3.4% 0.27% 0.13 12.9% 1.0% 0.5 50.0% 4.5% 2.3 
 
 
The impact of wearing face coverings was next considered. As the MID-AFT section 
experiences the highest infection probability the mask analysis is focused on this section and 
is demonstrated for a 12-hour flight (see Table 3).  
 
Assuming a mask effectiveness of 65.6%, the average infection probability is reduced from 
the range of 0.82% (Mild Scenario) to 10.8% (Severe Scenario) without masks to 0.10% to 
1.8% with masks, an average reduction of 86% (see Table 3).  In contrast, the maximum 
infection probability across the three scenarios is reduced by an average of 73%.  With the 
less efficient masks, the average reduction in average infection probability is 47% while the 
average reduction in maximum infection probability is 32% (see Table 3). While even the 
low efficiency mask results in a substantial reduction in infection probability, there is still a 
high probability of infection with the high efficiency mask. With an average 1.8% probability 
of infection, 1.3 of the 75 passengers seated in the MID-AFT section are likely to be infected 
in the Severe Scenario even though they are wearing the high efficiency masks.   It is also 
noted that  the infection probability for a 2-hour flight without face masks (Table 2) are 
similar to those for a 12-hour flight with all passengers wearing highly effective face masks 
(Table 3). 
 
Table 3. The estimated inflight infection probability and expected number of secondary 






Maximum, Average infection probability (%) and expected number of 
secondary infections 
5 quanta/h  
(Mild Scenario) 
20 quanta/h  
(medium Scenario) 
100 quanta/h  
(Severe Scenario) 
Max Mean Exp Max Mean Exp Max Mean Exp 
0 0 24.1% 0.82% 0.62 66.9% 2.8% 2.1 99.6% 10.8% 8.1 
31.0% 0 12.3% 0.40% 0.30 40.9% 1.5% 1.1 92.8% 6.0% 4.5 
31.0% 1 13.4% 0.44% 0.33 43.7% 1.6% 1.2 94.3% 6.5% 4.9 
65.6% 0 3.2% 0.10% 0.07 12.2% 0.40% 0.30 48.0% 1.8% 1.3 
65.6% 1 5.2% 0.16% 0.12 19.1% 0.64% 0.48 65.3% 2.8% 2.1 
 
On long duration flights, passengers are likely to remove their masks for some period of time, 
in particular during meal services.  As meal services are usually undertaken at the same time 
within a given cabin section, most passengers will have their masks removed at the same time 
as others nearby, so increasing the probability of infection.  For illustrative purposes we 
assume passengers spend a cumulative time of one hour for their meal with pre and post 
dinner drinks during their 12-hour flight.  
When masks are worn but removed by all passengers for a 1-hour meal service, the average 
infection probability compared to the no mask scenario is reduced by an average of 77% and 
43% across the three scenarios for the high and low efficiency masks respectively (see Table 
3).  The maximum infection probability across the three scenarios is reduced by an average of 
61% and 28% for the high and low efficiency masks respectively.  While this still represents 
a substantial improvement compared to the no mask situation, removing the high efficiency 
mask for a 1-hour period results in a 52%/59% increase in the maximum/average probability 
of infection compared to the situation where the mask is not removed.  The increase in 
infection probability for low efficiency mask is significantly smaller at 6%/8%.  
Discussion 
The key aspect of this work is the use of infection probability rather than time to infection to 
assess inflight transmission risk. Marcus et al. [13] estimated the time to infection of 7.5 
hours for passengers without wearing masks and 34 hours with wearing face masks for the 
severe scenario with a quanta generation rate of 100 quanta/h. They stated that their model 
results were in general agreement with the modelling results from aircraft manufacturers [9-
11] and with the empirical evidence from the US TRANSCOM study [14, 15] and so ‘the 
estimated dose inhaled by an adjacent passenger over a few hours of exposure is likely to be 
less than the amount necessary to cause a secondary infection’.  With an identical quanta 
generation rate (100 quanta/h) and the maximum BZP data from the MID-AFT section [14, 
15] we determine that the minimum time to infection (based on inhalation of 1 quanta) is 2.2 
hours without masks, and using the low/high efficiency masks, the minimum time to 
infection becomes 4.6 hours/18.5 hours (see Figure 1).   These times to infection are similar 
to those estimated in [13] and much less than those reported in [14].   
 
Nevertheless, we prefer to focus on the probabilities of infection within a given timeframe as 
some readers may misinterpret the “time to infection” to mean there is no possibility of 
infection if they are on-board for less than the stated timescales.  If time to infection is used 
to define an end-point, it is therefore also necessary to specify how this end-point is defined, 
in particular the quanta dose required to cause infection or the corresponding infection 
probability associated with the end-point (see Figure 1).  In our analysis of ‘time to 
infection’, we associate the inhalation of 1 quanta i.e. a 63% probability of being infected, 
with the end-point ‘being infected’.  However, there is still a chance of being infected and 
hence a time for infection for shorter exposures.   Furthermore, “time to infection” does not 
give an idea of the expected number of infections that could be caused by an index patient. 
 
Figure 1: Exposure time and infection probability for the maximum BZP data in the MID-
AFT section for the Severe Scenario  
 
For the most extreme case considered, involving a 12-hour flight in which the passengers 
were not wearing masks, and for the Severe Scenario, the average probability of infection 
within the highest risk zone (MID-AFT) is 10.8%.  With such a relatively low probability of 
infection it may be considered unlikely that an individual would be infected, unless they were 
in the seat of maximum exposure, in which case they would have a 99.6% probability of 
being infected.  Furthermore, if all the passengers wore low efficiency masks for the entire 
12-hour flight, this reduces the average probability of infection to 6.5% and this is further 
reduced to 2.8% if all the passengers are wearing high efficiency masks.    
 
However, if these probabilities are applied to all the passengers (75) in the MID-AFT section, 
then the expected number of secondary infected cases is 8.1 with no masks and 1.3 when high 
efficiency masks are used.  For the Medium and Mild scenarios the expected number of 
secondary infections is 2.1 and 0.6 respectively without masks and 0.3 and 0.1 respectively 
with high efficiency masks.  This analysis suggests that multiple secondary infections can 
occur on-board aircraft, even though the passengers are protected with high ventilation rates 
and HEPA filters, although mask wearing helps to mitigate this risk.  On average, the 
high/low efficiency masks reduce the average infection probability by 86%/47% and the 
maximum infection probability by 73%/32%.   
 
Thus the wearing of masks by all passengers and crew should be considered an essential 
requirement for all flights and should be worn by all who can wear them at all times.  
However, even with the wearing of masks there is still a non-negligible probability of 
infection.  Furthermore, removing masks, even for short periods on a 12-hour flight, such as 
for a 1-hour meal service, increases the average probability of infection by as much as 59%, 
compared to the situation where the mask is worn continuously. 
 
In the Severe Scenario with high efficiency masks, removing the mask for 1-hour results in 
2.1 of the 75 passengers seated in the MID-AFT section being infected, an increase of 0.8 
passengers compared to the case where masks are worn throughout.  If it is necessary to 
provide a meal service, airlines should keep the meal time to a minimum and consider 
alternating the meal times so that only half the passengers within a seat row are fed at any one 
time.  In this way, the passengers either side of the passenger currently being fed are wearing 
masks, thus reducing the impact on the maximum infection probability associated with the 
passenger adjacent to the index passenger. Clearly, this will increase the time required for the 
meal service but will reduce the maximum infection probability.   
 
There is also a clear class difference in the infection probabilities with the FWD (business 
class) section having much lower infection probabilities than the MID-AFT (economy class) 
section, which has the highest.  The FWD average infection probability is about one third for 
the Mild and Medium scenarios and 42% for the severe scenario of the MID-AFT 
probabilities.  These differences are probably due to a number of factors such as lower 
passenger numbers resulting in greater seating separations and the business class seat 
geometry possibly offering greater shielding.  It is also not clear if the ventilation rate in the 
business class cabin section is greater than that in the economy class section.   
 
The main limitation of this work is the assumed quanta generation rates because a reliable 
quanta generation rate distribution for COVID-19 is not known. However, the selected quanta 
generation rates used in the analysis are representative a wide range of quanta generation 
rates suggested from or derived from data for several COVID-19 transmission events 
reported in literature (see Supplementary Data).  While the quanta generation categories 
appear representative, the proportion of passengers likely to be represented by each category 
is currently unknown.  Furthermore, the emission rate of quanta from a given source is likely 
to vary during the flight as the index patient occasionally engages in speech rather than 
simply respiring and this is likely to be dependent on the nature of the passenger e.g. family 
groups, vacationers, business traveller.   The model input data derived from the TRANSCOM 
experiments [14, 15] also has a number of limitations.  Turbulent wakes produced by crew 
and passengers walking along the aisles were not considered. Furthermore, if the moving 
person is the index patient this is likely to spread infected aerosols over a larger portion of the 
cabin, possibly the entire aircraft if the infected person is a crew member.  Finally, it is 
unlikely that both the index and susceptible passengers remain rigidly still within their seats 
during the entire duration of the flight, as assumed in the experiment.   
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